Editorial by MULLER, Wim






I. Changes in editorial policy: Introducing the ‘current developments’ section 
 
The theme of the current issue, ‘comparing law’, marks the opening of the third 
volume of the European Journal of Legal Studies. Although this issue still follows the format 
taken by the Journal thus far, the Editorial Board has decided to introduce a number of 
changes, or rather additions in the current volume. In order to take better advantage of the 
web-based nature of the Journal, we have started to accept submissions in a new ‘current 
developments’ section which will be published on a ‘rolling’ publication schedule, i.e. 
contributions will be published as they are received and reviewed by the Editorial Board. 
Articles which are part of a thematic unity, such as the current collection of articles on 
‘comparing law’ and future thematic calls for papers, or articles linked to a conference or 
seminar, are still published together as an issue. The Editorial Board therefore now welcomes 
submissions on current legal developments in each of the main sections of the European 
Journal of Legal Studies: international law, European law, comparative law, and theories of 
law. The new Current Developments section will appear on the website soon. 
 
II. Comparing law 
 
Virtually every analysis involves an act of comparison, if only a comparison of the 
object of analysis to the author’s own subjective framework. Although in legal scholarship 
one immediately thinks about the field of comparative law when the act of comparison is 
mentioned, it is also obvious that comparisons are also made all the time in other legal 
disciplines. When inviting submissions for this issue of the European Journal of Legal 
Studies, the Editorial Board decided to emphasise two specific types of comparison: 
comparisons between laws, across all kinds of fields and jurisdictions, within jurisdictions, 
and between layers of multi-level jurisdictions; and laws that compare, and the way scholars 
and practitioners of law apply them, i.e., the way lawyers compare, and the rules that govern 
such comparisons. 
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Our first contribution, by Kati Cseres, focuses on comparisons in one eminently 
suitable area: EU competition law and its application across twenty-seven member states. She 
examines what the purpose of the comparative efforts is as well as their methodology, and 
provides a critical analysis of the method of voluntary convergence, and the possibility of 
further extended harmonisation rules in member states. Interestingly, Cseres finds that the 
harmonisation of the substantive competition rules and the need to unify them across all EU 
member states actually led to greater attention to comparative methods, as the specific 
procedural and institutional settings in the member states in which these uniform substantive 
rules were applied needed to be examined. Since the European Commission no longer holds 
the central position in which it almost solely determines the application of EU competition 
rules and has to accept the reality that national competition authorities apply the same rules, it 
has had to take a comparative approach to assess the different ways in which the rules were 
applied domestically. Cseres criticises the way in which this has been done, arguing that the 
current method presents both practical and legal difficulties. In conclusion, she argues that 
comparative analysis between competition laws in Europe could benefit from a more 
objective, transparent and more efficient approach, with less of an emphasis on legal 
transplants and more on competition between the different legal formants. 
 
By making an argument in favour of trial and error in order to find the best solutions 
to complex legal problems, Cseres emphasises the importance of the act of comparison in the 
process of problem-solving, and highlights its practical utility. 
 
The second author in this issue, David Marrani, engages in comparisons for a different 
purpose. In his article on the symbolic position of the judge in western European legal 
traditions, he uses comparisons to demonstrate how the legal event “is a process of 
communication where judges, parties and advocates interact […] through a system of 
dialogue-monologue in a dialectical relationship”. Although there are some differences, this is 
true both in civil law and common law traditions. Drawing on insights from psychoanalytical 
theory, he presents three elements which condition the symbolic position of the judge: the 
perception of the judges’ function, the appearance and protection of judges through dress and 
ceremony, and the identification of the judge with that ‘in the name of’ which he is seen to do 
justice. Although the methods of truth-finding and resolution of disputes were very different 
before, convergence has taken place since the Second World War under the influence of the 
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European Convention of Human Rights. Marrani’s original approach gives new life to a 
comparison which seemed to have been exhausted, and provides the reader with new ways to 
reflect on what is actually happening during the legal process, rather than a dry application of 
the law on the books. 
 
Whereas Marrani engages in an old comparison in a new way, Ottavio Quirico, in his 
article on the new procedure for constitutional review in France, uses two other modes of 
comparison to shine light on the topic under discussion in his article. In 2008, France 
introduced a novel system of constitutional review, which incorporated prior verification into 
review a posteriori. Previously, these two forms of review of the constitutionality of a law 
were separated. After a discussion of the history of constitutional review in French 
administrative law, Quirico concludes that the new hybrid system will undoubtedly serve as a 
point of reference for other legal systems, and thus serve as a touchstone for future 
comparisons. In demonstrating why exactly this system is new, Quirico compares the new 
system to those exisiting in Italy, Spain, Austria and Germany, and contrasts the models of 
constitutional review in civil law (modelled after Kelsen) and common law (modelled after 
Schmitt), comparing them to each other. The new French model is the first to bridge the 
distinctions existing between these models. The author foresees problems in the French 
system when a simultaneous review of constitutionality and compliance with international 
treaties will have to be made. This is solved by separating these two forms of review and to 
prioritise the review of constitutionality, even though this raises issues under international and 
European law. Avoiding one comparison, between constitutional review and compliance 
review, thus leads to an unfavourable comparison at a later stage. 
 
While Quirico is very much concerned with present-day positive law, comparing 
various forms of administrative law, the first contributor to the Legal Theory section, Michele 
Mangini, takes the reader into an exploration of more fundamental questions and invites us to 
reflect on the nature of values in present-day liberalism. Mangini calls for a re-examination of 
the notion of ‘virtues’ as described by early liberal philosophers, and argues that the 
conception of the good conveyed by virtue ethics deserve a more careful treatment than it 
usually gets from virtue ethics theorists. In particular, there appears to be a certain overlap 
between agency goods perfectionism and natural law theory in the area of virtues. The author 
supports this position by presenting the reader with a careful description of current and 
previous trends in liberal political theory, examining and comparing various visions of 
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perfectionism before arriving at the linkage between agency goods perfectionism and new 
natural law. These links may serve to answer a need the author currently perceives within 
liberal theory for a value orientation that goes beyond a relativistic view of values. He argues 
that rights theories fall short in connecting the experiences of the good life and well-being to 
those of the right and justice, and that virtue ethics provides a way out of this impasse. 
Mangini’s analysis and comparison of the various theories ultimately leads him to conclude 
that the traditional theory of the good from which liberalism developed, is not irreconcilable 
with liberal pluralism. Comparing the various theories thus leads the author to a conclusion in 
which room is left for a liberal society to allow its citizens to compare different values. 
 
Our next author, Oles Andriychuk, keeps us in the realm of virtue ethics, but from an 
altogether different perspective than professor Mangini, although his contribution can at the 
same time can be read as an application of professor Mangini’s conclusions. He proposes to 
treat economic freedom as a political virtue, and thus attempts to take it beyond the 
consequentialist framework in which it is usually justified. Instead of justifying the market 
process only with utilitarian arguments, Andriychuk argues that it should be considered as the 
‘essence and intrinsic core’ of liberal democracy. Economic freedom -and freedom in general- 
then becomes a right of an ethical and not only practical value. In this perspective, the act of 
comparison is an essential component of economic freedom as reflected in the market and of 
freedom in general; the market process is a process of evolution, in which comparisons are 
constantly made in a dialetical process which helps yield the best result. 
 
One of the core values of a liberal society is freedom of expression, which itself is a 
prime candidate for comparison because of the divergent developments the interpretation of 
this value has taken on either side of the Atlantic. In his contribution on “Instrumentalisation 
of Freedom of Expression in Postmodern Legal Discourses”, Uladzislau Belavusau makes 
various comparisons regarding this right. Aside from an implicit comparison -more 
pronounced towards the end of his contribution- between the American and European 
approaches to freedom of expression, the author also contrasts the notions of free speech in 
critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence, and queer or LGBT legal discourse. The different 
forms of criticism that arise from these various discourses lead to divergent conclusions. 
However, what they have in common is their critical approach to the mainstream legal 
discourse. Belavusau explores these issues and concludes that the European legal scholarship 
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on free speech should incorporate more of the insights from the historical and literary 
approaches taken by critical scholars. 
 
III. Book Reviews 
 
Finally, in this issue two books are reviewed by members of the Editorial Board. 
Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça reviews Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling: On the Governance 
of Law, a collection of essays with an interdisciplinary approach to law and governance. The 
title of his review, ‘The Ashes of Law’, reflects the contradictions that this paradigm of 
analysis leaves even in this very collection. David Baez Seara reviews Making the Law 
Explicit by Matthias Klatt under the label of ‘The implicit normativity of law’. 
 
IV. Final remarks 
 
Together, the contributions to this issue of the European Journal of Legal Studies 
demonstrate that reflecting on comparison, we are necessarily drawn into reflecting on 
dialectical processes, convergence and divergence, and evolution, and realise that this is all 
done in the pursuit of progress. On behalf of the Editorial Board, I hope the reader will find 
the contributions to this issue insightful and thought-provoking. As always, feedback is 
welcome on our website as well as at ejls@eui.eu. 
